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### SUMMARY

- 1. This is our third Executive Committee discussion of the proposed Senior Intelligence Service (SIS). We are now at the point of final review and decision.
- 2. At our last meeting we made certain policy changes in the basic proposal and the changes were sent out for your comments. Based on these, I have met with the DDCI and certain changes have been made. Also, some changes were made in discussions with the DCI.
  - a. Have eliminated the DCI Senior Resource Board.
  - b. The composition of the Performance Review Committee (PRC) has been elevated to include the Deputy Directors, the Chairman, E Career Service, and the Director of Personnel.
- 3. The comments received present issues of two types: (1) those that should be resolved prior to implementation of the SIS, e.g., coverage, conversion, etc., and; (2) those that do not need to be decided prior to implementation but can be staffed out in ensuing months, e.g., that dealing with the award structure.
- 4. What we should first attempt to do is to decide those issues that must be decided prior to implementation. If time permits, we can discuss the other issues, if not we can have another Executive Committee Meeting in the near future to discuss those points.

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  - A. Issues to be Decided Prior to Implementation:

### (1) Effective Date.

All but the DDS&T agree that the SIS should be implemented on 1 October. The DDS&T suggests instead that the Agency issue a notice of intent to establish a SIS with an outline of its structure and to furnish additional details around 1 November.

#### OP Comment.

With the few issues remaining to be decided, we see no reason to delay.

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### (2) Inclusion of SPS.

The DDS&T argues that SPS individuals are not subject to the same incumbency ceiling as are our supergraders and the proposal would place both under one ceiling for the first time. He fears that this would make it difficult to hire this expertise. He is also concerned with SPSers having to compete against supergrade managers for awards.

### OP Comment.

There is already existing a SPS ceiling as there is on the number of supergrades. The proposal merely adds this ceiling to the other, and should in no way impair the DDS&T's hiring capability for such expertise. It should be noted that CIA has never fully encumbered the SPS ceiling. Presently, only positions (of the ceiling) are classified as SPS positions and only are encumbered.

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Competition for awards will be on the basis of quality of performance and achievement. The SPS individual therefore should not be disadvantaged when competing against supergrade managers because no advantage will accrue to the manager, it will be the performance that counts.

(3) RMS/CTS Suggest that the Name of the New Program be Called the DCI's Senior Intelligence Services.

This will make clear that the CIA and ICS parallel programs both flow from the DCI's authority.

OP Comment.

No problem.

(4) Consequences for Those Not Electing to Join SIS:

Raised by Acting DD/A.

OP Comment.

The individual will be allowed to remain in his position, but will not be eligible for promotion, awards, leave accrual, sabbaticals, etc. When DCI determines that individual is blocking SIS development, individual may be reduced in grade and reassigned to GS-15 position. (OGC will review legality of downgrade.)

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### (5) Conversion Scale.

Both the Acting DD/A and the DD/O raised questions of equity or management concerns by the conversion scale initially proposed.

### OP Comment.

Since that time the President has issued new pay rates for the various SIS levels, which we now propose. This should eliminate the DD/O's concern. In addition, salary levels as of the forthcoming pay raise should be issued in the initial conversion. This will respond to the Acting DD/A's concern.

### (6) The Annual Work Plan (AWP).

The Comptroller properly expresses concern about the AWP.

### OP Comment.

We believe that the AWP, now a part of the Performance Appraisal Report (PAR), with the additional instructions currently being developed by the Office of Personnel will provide supervisors, and employees for that matter, with the necessary guidance needed.

## (7) Mandatory or Voluntary Participation in the SIS.

The Deputy General Counsel raises the question of whether individuals should have such an option.

### OP Comment.

We continue to believe that employees should decide this question for themselves once they know what the advantages of joining the SIS are and what the penalties are for not joining.

#### (8) Supergrades in a PRA Situation:

The Acting DD/A has raised the question of how supergrades in a PRA status will be handled.

### OP Comment.

Should be treated like any other supergrade. At the same time it should be recognized that since they will be in a PRA status their performance is expected to be significantly higher in the lower-graded positions. Consequently, while eligible for performance awards, their achievement will have to be that much more significant.

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# B. Issues That Have to be Resolved Subsequent to Implementation:

# (1) Submission of awards for rotatees.

At the last meeting it was agreed that such awards would go through line management to the PRC for their comments. Both the Acting DD/A and the DD/O suggest a dual policy wherein awards could be recommended by the either the operating component or the Career Service.

## OP Comment.

Should be one way or the other. The DDCI suggests a procedure where both can collaborate on award recommendation and that a presentation of the total number of awards be reserved for notices.

## (2) Limit on Number of Awards.

The DDS&T is concerned about the morale factor of those 50 percent who do not receive awards. He suggests increasing the percentage to reduce the non-winners.

### OP Comment.

Although we are exempt from the Civil Service Reform Act which specifically includes the 50 percent limitation, we believe it unwise to take advantage of our exemption to create additional awards—at least for the first year.

# (3) Use of Awards to Ease Grade Compression.

The DDS&T suggests that the Committee consider consider tailoring the performance award structure to compensate for grade compression, i.e., giving performance awards to higher fractions of the more senior SISers or allocating bonuses proportionate to the levels of responsibility. The Comptroller takes the opposite point of view.

### OP Comment.

The salary levels proposed by the President are intended to recognize levels of responsibility, and awards structure is to recognize performance. We believe that it would be fatal to the system to use the awards structure to ease grade compression and strongly feel that we must avoid any action which can be perceived to favor the more senior management levels.

# (4) Allocation of Award Quotas to the Deputy Directors.

The DDS&T is concerned about the interleaving of the Career Services' recommendations into a master prioritized list and suggests that it may be preferable to agree that a fixed percentage of SIS members in each Career Service will be eligible for performance awards at the SIS-1, 2 and 3 levels and leave it to the individual Career Services to identify them.

### OP Comment,

While there is time to prepare various options for DCI, DDCI and Executive Committee consideration and how awards are to be allocated, our initial view is against such an allocation. It is possible within such a system that there will be deserving members in one Career Service outside of the allocation whose achievements surpass those of others in another Career Service brought within the allocation. Moreover, it is our view that the DCI/DDCI should maintain management flexibility in their allocation of awards to include recognition of mission accomplishment. For Example, they could easily decide that one component within a Career Service should receive a greater allocation than other components in the same Career Service because of oustanding mission accomplishment.

# (5) Separation of Promotion Process from the Performance Review Process.

The Comptroller suggests that this distinction be reaffirmed and explicitly maintained throughout the paper.

### OP Comment.

We agree and are taking the necessary action to ensure that the existing promotion system, i.e., Career Services to the Director of Personnel to the DDCI, DCI by maintained.

# (6) Coverage of SISers Who Monitor Activities of Others.

Both the Inspector General and the Deputy General Counsel expressed a concern that the system for evaluating members of the SIS and recommedning them for performance awards creates a potential threat to the independence of those individuals of the Agency who are responsible for policing the activities of various Agency components, e.g., Inspectors, Attorneys, and Auditors. They propose, therefore, that these officers and others faced with the same threat by administered directly by the DCI/DDCI.

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### OP Comment.

We see no difference between the proposed system of awards and other existing Agency mechanisms. For example, the HMAB Suggestion Awards Committee, the promotion process, QSI's, Exceptional Achievement Awards and the like, all present the same potential threat to independence raised by the Inspector General and the Deputy General Counsel. We are not aware of any complaint.

Notwithstanding the numbers involved are not all that large so that removing them from review by the PRC is manageable so long as it is clear that they obtain no extra advantage from being under the direct aegis of DCI/DDCI.

### (7) Need for the PRC.

The Comptroller questions whether a review by the PRC is necessary.

### OP Comment.

It is our understanding that all agencies implementing the SES have an additional coordinating body to ensure the validity of award dispensations. We believe there is merit in such a review to provide the Director the best possible advice on the merits of individuals competing with other for limited numbers of awards. Our viewisthatthe Deputy Directors, who now sit on the PRC, are in a good position to weigh with each other the relative merit of individual achievement and mission accomplishment, and collaborating on a priority list.

At the same time if the PRC is eliminated, the Office of Personnel through its Support Staff could provide a centralized review function.